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Abstract
This essay examines the challenges in devising rules for unconventional monetary policy
suitable for a post-crisis world. It is argued that unconventional monetary policy instruments
are a poor substitute for conventional interest-rate policy in stabilizing the economy and in
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targeting are made to reduce the need for unconventional policy instruments in the future.
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1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis and the Great Recession, monetary policy has become constrained by a lower
bound on the nominal interest rate. Central bankers, cautious by nature, have found themselves
experimenting with a wide range of unconventional policy tools to substitute for their inability to
cut interest rates further. This essay examines the challenges in devising rules for unconventional
monetary policy suitable for a post-crisis world.
The first contribution of the essay is in setting up a simple economic model that can be used
to analyse a variety of unconventional policy instruments. An unconventional policy instrument is
defined as any instrument of the central bank that does not depend for its operation on changing
the risk-free nominal interest rate now or in the future. This includes several types of balance-
sheet policies where the central bank purchases assets (for example, quantitative easing or credit
easing), emergency lending, and subsidized access to central-bank credit. Unconventional policy
as defined also includes ‘macroprudential’ policy instruments that place restrictions on borrowing
independently of interest rates.
The analysis of the economic model suggests that unconventional monetary policy instruments
are a poor substitute for the conventional nominal interest rate. While both types of policy instru-
ment have nominal and real effects on the economy, these effects are not equivalent. In particular,
the use of unconventional policy to stabilize the economy today has a negative effect on the stabil-
ity of the economy in the future. Consequently, it is not possible to use unconventional monetary
policy to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, unlike conventional policy if it were uncon-
strained by the lower bound on interest rates. The optimal rule for conventional monetary policy
can be expressed as a simple inflation target, but optimal unconventional policy is different and
more complicated because of intertemporal trade-offs.
Following a rule for the unconventional instruments of monetary policy is also more difficult
because unconventional policy has larger distributional effects than conventional policy. This means
unconventional monetary policy is likely to attract greater political controversy than regular mon-
etary policy, which makes it harder to insulate central banks from political pressure. The more
monetary policy is swayed by distributional concerns, the less it is able to support an efficient
allocation of credit in the economy.
While unconventional monetary policy has undesirable features, it has been argued that the low
level of the natural rate of interest makes it hard to normalize monetary policy and return to using
conventional instruments. However, the economic model applied in this essay has the property
that the market-clearing real interest rate is not independent of the conduct of monetary policy.
This suggests the concept of the natural interest rate should be applied with greater caution when
thinking about monetary policy.
Finally, given the drawbacks of unconventional monetary policy tools, the essay closes with some
thoughts on how inflation targeting might evolve to reduce the need to use unconventional policy
instruments in the future. Rather than simply changing the level of inflation targets, this essay
argues for a more radical reform that puts greater weight on asset prices when targeting inflation.
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2 A simple model for monetary policy analysis
The analysis is based around a simple macroeconomic model taken from Sheedy (2017a), augmented
below to study unconventional monetary policy. The model builds in several key features that are
arguably essential to study monetary policy in a post-crisis world. First, there is private borrowing
and lending in equilibrium because the model features heterogeneity among individuals. Second,
asset prices play an important role because individuals will want to buy and sell houses over their
lifetimes, which means that changes in house prices will affect the balance sheets of borrowers and
lenders.1 Third, there is a role for monetary policy to have real consequences because of nominal
contracts, specifically, nominal debt contracts for borrowing to buy houses (mortgages) or to bring
forward consumption. The use of nominal debt contracts by households and firms means that the
economy has incomplete financial markets.2
The economy features overlapping generations of individuals who have deterministic lives span-
ning three discrete time periods. Individuals of different generations are referred to as the ‘young’,
‘middle-aged’, and ‘old’, indexed by τ ∈ {y,m, o}. There is no population growth, and the economy
is at a stationary age distribution with a measure one of each cohort currently alive.
Individuals born at date t have the following lifetime expected utility function:
Ut = logCy,t + δEt [logCm,t+1 + Θ(Hm,t+1)] + δ
2Et logCo,t+2, [2.1]
where Cτ,t denotes per-person consumption of a composite good by individuals of age τ at time
t. Utility is logarithmic in consumption of goods. Housing services Hm,t is a continuous variable,
and the housing utility function Θ(H) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies an Inada
condition (Θ′(H) > 0, Θ′′(H) < 0, and limH→0 Θ′(H) = ∞). The subjective discount factor is δ
(satisfying 0 < δ <∞), and Et denotes expectations conditional on time-t information.
Two assumptions about individuals give rise to a simple pattern of gains from trade in financial
markets. First, individuals receive labour income only while middle-aged. For simplicity, there is no
choice of hours, so each middle-aged individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour Nm,t. Each
unit of labour receives real wage wt, so labour income ym,t is:
ym,t = wtNm,t, where Nm,t = 1. [2.2]
Under these assumptions, youth can be interpreted as the very beginning of an individual’s career,
and old age as the beginning of retirement. The second assumption is that utility from hous-
ing services (Hm,t in 2.1) is received only while middle-aged, and can only be obtained through
homeownership. Houses must be purchased and held between t − 1 and t to enjoy utility flows at
time t. Consequently, individuals will want to buy and sell houses over their life-cycle, which can
be interpreted as ‘trading up’ and ‘trading down’. Furthermore, because of the first assumption,
house purchases and consumption will need to be financed using debt when young, while later in
the life-cycle, households will need to hold financial assets as a pension to enjoy consumption in
1The model adds housing to the earlier overlapping generations model of Sheedy (2013).
2Monetary policy with incomplete financial markets is also studied by Koenig (2013), and Sheedy (2014) analyses
the quantitative importance of incomplete financial markets compared to other nominal frictions.
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retirement.
Money is used as a unit of account, but the analysis abstracts from money’s role as a medium
of exchange. The nominal price of a unit of goods is denoted by Pt and the nominal price of a unit
of housing by Vt.
Financial markets are incomplete. Individuals can hold only three assets: houses, nominal bonds,
and corporate equity; and can issue only nominal bonds as liabilities. Let Bτ,t denote the quantity
of nominal bonds purchased (or issued, if negative) by households of age τ at the end of time period
t, and Uτ,t the number of shares purchased (short sales of equity are not allowed, Uτ,t ≥ 0). Each
nominal bond is a riskless claim on one monetary unit of account at time t + 1 (the face value is
one unit of money). Each unit of corporate equity is a claim on a single dividend payment Xt+1
(specified in nominal terms) at time t+ 1. At time t, the nominal prices of bonds and shares are Qt
and Jt respectively.
Individuals are born with no initial assets or liabilities and leave no bequests. The budget
identities of the young, middle-aged, and old are respectively:
Cy,t +
VtHm,t+1
Pt
+
QtBy,t
Pt
+
JtUy,t
Pt
= 0; [2.3a]
Cm,t +
VtHo,t+1
Pt
+
QtBm,t
Pt
+
JtUm,t
Pt
= ym,t +
VtHm,t
Pt
+
By,t−1
Pt
+
XtUy,t−1
Pt
; [2.3b]
Co,t =
VtHo,t
Pt
+
Bm,t−1
Pt
+
XtUm,t−1
Pt
. [2.3c]
Maximizing expected utility (2.1) with respect to house purchases Hm,t+1, net bond positions By,t
and Bm,t, and purchases of corporate equity Um,t, subject to the budget identities in (2.3), implies
the following first-order conditions:
Vt
PtCy,t
= δEt
[
Θ′(Hm,t+1) +
γVt+1
Pt+1Cm,t+1
]
; [2.4a]
Qt
PtCy,t
= δEt
[
1
Pt+1Cm,t+1
]
; [2.4b]
Qt
PtCm,t
= δEt
[
1
Pt+1Co,t+1
]
; [2.4c]
Jt
PtCm,t
= δEt
[
Xt+1
Pt+1Co,t+1
]
. [2.4d]
It is shown in Sheedy (2017a) that the equity short-sale constraint for the young is always binding
(Uy,t = 0), so there is no first-order condition included for Uy,t. Similarly, house purchases are made
only while young (Ho,t = 0), at least under conditions where monetary policy does not give rise to
a rational bubble in the housing market, which is assumed in what follows.3
The supply of houses Ht is assumed to be inelastic and of measure one:
Ht = 1. [2.5]
There are no maintenance costs.
3Bubbles are a possibility in an overlapping generations economy with incomplete financial markets, even though
housing is a perpetual asset. The issue of rational bubbles and monetary policy is explored in Sheedy (2017b).
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There is a unit continuum of representative firms in the economy. The representative firm has
capital Kt and hires labour Nt to produce output Yt according to the constant-returns Cobb-Douglas
production function below:
Yt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t , [2.6]
where α is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (satisfying 0 < α < 1), and At is the
level of total factor productivity. Capital is acquired through investment It, which transforms one
unit of final goods into one unit of capital goods. There is a one-period time-to-build, and capital
depreciates at rate 100% for tractability, thus the link between the capital stock and investment is:
Kt = It−1. [2.7]
Firms hire units of labour in a competitive market at real wage wt. Total factor productivity At is
an exogenous stochastic process.
Firms live for one time period. They raise finance (debt and equity) in period t and invest in
capital. At time t + 1 they hire labour and use installed capital to produce output, and then pay
out profits after debt repayments as dividends. Without loss of generality, assume each firm issues
a unit measure of shares. Any bonds issued are one-period nominal bonds, with Bf,t denoting the
quantity of such bonds issued by the representative firm. The accounting identity for financing
investment It is:
PtIt = ΛtJt, where Λt ≡ 1 + QtBf,t
Jt
, [2.8]
with the variable Λt denoting the corporate leverage ratio. Given bond and share prices Qt and
Jt, the choice of the quantity Bf,t of bonds to issue is the same as a choice of the leverage ratio
Λt. At time t + 1, the representative firm has nominal revenues Pt+1Yt+1, a nominal wage bill
wt+1Pt+1Nt+1, and nominal debt repayments Bf,t. Nominal dividends Xt+1 are revenues net of
wages and debt repayments:
Xt = PtYt − wtPtNt −Bf,t−1. [2.9]
Using the production function (2.6), the level of employment that maximizes dividends is:
(1− α)AtKαt N−αt = wt, [2.10]
and this equation must hold irrespective of the financing of investment and the ownership of the
firm. It is shown in Sheedy (2017a) that any corporate leverage ratio Λt ≥ 1 is consistent with
equilibrium in this simple model.
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In equilibrium, the goods, labour, housing, bond, and stock markets must clear:
Ct + It = Yt, where Ct = Cy,t + Cm,t + Co,t; [2.11a]
Nm,t = Nt; [2.11b]
Hm,t+1 +Ho,t+1 = Ht; [2.11c]
By,t +Bm,t = Bf,t; [2.11d]
Uy,t + Um,t = 1. [2.11e]
This completes the description of the model.
3 Conventional and unconventional policy instruments
The distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ monetary policy instruments is now
defined. The conventional monetary policy instrument is the central bank’s control of the interest
rate on risk-free nominal bonds. Unconventional monetary policy is then defined as a residual
category: any other type of intervention by the central bank that does not depend for its operation
on changing the risk-free nominal interest rate now or in the future.
Unconventional monetary policy instruments include balance-sheet policies, comprising various
types of quantitative easing and credit easing policies (see, for example, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache
and Sack, 2011, Woodford, 2012). Unconventional policy also includes emergency lending pro-
grammes and subsidized access to credit more generally. These policy instruments are seen as
providing additional ‘easing’ even without any change in the risk-free nominal interest rate.
As defined, the unconventional instruments of monetary policy also include newer ‘macropruden-
tial’ policies, which place additional restrictions on access to credit above and beyond the interest
rate charged (for a survey, see Galati and Moessner, 2013). For example, more stringent loan-to-
value ratios for mortgages might be imposed on banks. This type of policy is seen as tightening
financial conditions even without any adjustment of the risk-free nominal interest rate.
Under the definition of ‘conventional’ policy instruments adopted here, policies such as ‘forward
guidance’, where information is revealed about the future path of nominal interest rates (see Camp-
bell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano, 2012), are classified as conventional policies. This is because the
policy is really a commitment to use a conventional policy instrument in a particular way at a future
date.4 Note also that the definition of ‘conventional’ applies only to the instruments of monetary
policy, not to the goals (which could be ‘unconventional’ in a different sense).
3.1 The conventional monetary policy instrument
The central bank provides interest-bearing reserves that are a perfect substitute for risk-free nominal
bonds. By setting the interest rate it paid on reserves, the central bank can determine the nominal
4This classification is justified to the extent that the transmission mechanism of successfully-communicated forward
guidance is not so different from standard monetary policy, where expectations about the future also play a crucial
role. See Woodford (2012) for further discussion.
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bond price Qt:
Qt ≡ 1
1 + it
, where it ≥ 0. [3.1]
Reserves can be exchanged for physical cash, and it is assumed this cash can be stored costlessly.5
These features of money place a zero lower bound it ≥ 0 on the nominal interest rate.
3.2 Unconventional monetary policy instruments
While the economic model of section 2 naturally has a role for the nominal interest rate set by
the central bank because this affects borrowing and saving decisions (with real effects due to the
presence of nominal contracts), introducing unconventional policy instruments requires adding some
additional features to the model to understand how these might affect individuals’ behaviour. It is
argued below that various types of unconventional monetary policy instrument all lead to borrowers’
Euler equation (2.4b) being replaced by:
(1− τt)Qt
PtCy,t
= δEt
[
1
Pt+1Cm,t+1
]
, [3.2]
where the variable τt is directly determined by the new policy instruments. The new policy in-
struments captured by τt thus appear as a wedge in borrowers’ Euler equation that will affect the
amount of borrowing in addition to the nominal interest rate it. It turns out that this will be the
only change to the equilibrium conditions of the economy.
3.2.1 Balance-sheet policies
Assume the central bank makes purchases B˜t of nominal bonds. These purchases are targeted, with
the central bank buying only household debt, not corporate bonds or equity. This can be interpreted
as purchases of mortgage-backed securities, which formed a key component of the Federal Reserve’s
large-scale asset purchases. Suppose the central bank finances its asset purchases by issuing interest-
bearing reserves Bt. From the perspective of those who will buy and hold these reserves, the reserves
are essentially the same as nominal bonds. This means the market price of each unit of reserves
sold by the central bank is Qt.
The central bank is assumed to match the payoffs of the assets it purchases to its liabilities in the
future so that there are no profits or losses to be passed on to future generations. This assumption is
made to abstract from any direct intergenerational redistribution that would otherwise result from
such asset purchases. In this simple analysis, the assets and liabilities on both sides of the central
bank’s balance sheet fundamentally have the same characteristics, so the central-bank balance sheet
must be such that:
B˜t = Bt. [3.3]
A key assumption is that the central bank offers to buy bonds B˜t from borrowers at a price Q˜t
5Cash is not explicitly modelled here. See Azariadis, Bullard, Singh and Suda (2015) for an analysis of the zero
lower bound problem in an incomplete-markets economy with cash.
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that may be different from the market price Qt that would otherwise prevail. The central bank
would not be able to find willing sellers of bonds if the price it offered were Q˜t < Qt, so that case
is inconsistent with equilibrium in financial markets and attention is restricted to Q˜t ≥ Qt. To
sustain a differential between Q˜t and Qt and ensure that financial markets can be in equilibrium
without restricting the size B˜t of the asset purchases, the central bank must act in such a way that
no arbitrage opportunities are available. One crude way to achieve this is by making its purchases
and sales of bonds discriminatory: the central bank will only buy bonds from young borrowers,6
and it will only offer interest-bearing reserves to individuals who are not young.7
With this asset purchase programme in place, the central bank is now a buyer and a seller in
different segments of the bond market. The bond-market clearing condition (2.11d) is replaced by:
By,t +Bm,t + B˜t = Bf,t +Bt, where it is required that B˜t ≤ −By,t. [3.4]
The latter condition is needed because if bond purchases are made only from young borrowers, the
amount −By,t that the young borrow puts a limit on the maximum size of the asset purchases in
equilibrium. Note that the young are always willing to sell to the central bank rather than the
market because Q˜t ≥ Qt.
Whenever Q˜t > Qt, equation (3.3) implies that the central bank’s actions would result in an
immediate loss. To abstract from any direct redistributional effects of the central bank’s asset
purchases, this loss is passed on as a lump-sum tax −Tt (in real terms) paid by each young individual.
The lump-sum tax is targeted to the young because they are the direct beneficiaries of being able
to sell their bonds at a higher price to the central bank.8 The required net transfer Tt is:
Tt =
−(Q˜tB˜t −QtBt)
Pt
, [3.5]
and this is taken as given by each individual. The budget constraint of the young in (2.3a) is
replaced by:
Cy,t +
VtHm,t+1
Pt
+
Qt(By,t + B˜t)
Pt
=
Q˜tB˜t
Pt
+ Tt, [3.6]
where By,t + B˜t denotes the net bond trades of the young in the market, excluding sales of bonds
to the central bank. If the central bank is the buyer of the marginal unit of bonds issued by young
6This limitation on the central bank’s dealings is needed to ensure its asset purchases are targeted to supporting
mortgage borrowing by the young. It is implicit that the young cannot trade with the central bank on behalf of
others to exploit arbitrage.
7Consider an alternative assumption where the central bank would offer to buy bonds from the middle-aged rather
than the young at price Q˜t > Qt. Since the middle-aged would need to be able to buy bonds on the market at price
Qt in order to have any financial wealth in retirement, there would be no equilibrium if the size of the central bank’s
purchases was unrestricted because the middle-aged could make unlimited profits from arbitrage. If the purchases
were limited, arbitrage profits would be finite. However, under this alternative assumption, the marginal bond
purchased by the middle-aged would have price Qt, and the young would also sell at price Qt, so the policy would
have no effect apart from generating a lump-sum transfer to the middle-aged.
8It would also be possible to consider a lump-sum tax paid by all individuals. This would add some additional
complications without changing the substance of the results. The key assumption is that the central bank and
government cannot target lump-sum taxes and transfers in such a way as to offset the incompleteness of financial
markets. Furthermore, such direct redistributions through lump-sum taxes ought to be classified as fiscal policy, not
monetary policy.
7
borrowers then the Euler equation (2.4b) needs to be adjusted to reflect the higher price Q˜t:
Q˜t
PtCy,t
= δEt
[
1
Pt+1Cm,t+1
]
if B˜t = −By,t, otherwise (2.4b) holds. [3.7]
If the central bank is not the marginal buyer, the bond price in borrowers’ Euler equation is simply
the market price Qt. The budget identity and Euler equation of middle-aged savers are unaffected
by any of these changes to the central bank’s operating procedures.
Observe that equations (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6) can be combined to deduce that the original budget
identity of the young (2.3a) must hold in equilibrium. The original bond-market clearing condition
(2.11d) also follows from (3.3) and (3.4) in equilibrium. Given the market price of bonds Qt, the
central bank’s intervention price Q˜t, and the size of the asset purchase B˜t, define a variable τt as
follows:
τt =
−(Q˜t −Qt)/Q˜t if B˜t = −By,t0 otherwise . [3.8]
In the case where the central bank is the marginal buyer, the variable τt is equal to the negative
of the premium paid by the central bank for borrowers’ bonds above what would otherwise be the
market price. It follows that Q˜t = (1− τt)Qt, and hence the new Euler equation for borrowers (3.7)
is equivalent to (3.2) with τt as defined in (3.8). Note that this is the only change to the equilibrium
conditions of the economy.
By setting the intervention price relative to the market price, and the size of the intervention,
the central bank can determine the value of τt, which can in principle take any value satisfying
−1 < τt ≤ 0. When the central bank is not the marginal buyer, τt = 0, which means the asset
purchases would have no effect on the economy’s equilibrium conditions.
It is immediately apparent that asset purchases made at the market price (Q˜t = Qt) have no
impact whatsoever on the economy. Since τt = 0 in this case, the equilibrium conditions of the
economy are identical to those in the absence of the asset purchases, so the policy has no effect on
either nominal or real variables no matter what the size of B˜t. This is just a version of the well-
known neutrality results for balance-sheet policies (see, for example, Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003,
Woodford, 2012). If the central bank lends more to the private sector, private agents lend less and
simply hold more interest-bearing reserves instead, leaving the total amount of lending unaffected.
Taking account of the central bank’s budget constraint, this change in private behaviour delivers
exactly the same allocation as before, so no market-clearing prices are affected.
This reasoning does not apply when the price paid for the assets purchased by the central bank
is not the market price. In that case, the central bank’s asset purchases effectively make credit
available that would not have been forthcoming from private agents at the market price. This
implicit subsidy (paid for by a reduction in central bank profits, all else equal) increases the total
amount of borrowing, which can therefore have an effect on the economy’s equilibrium.
Whether or not actual asset-purchase programmes have simply replaced private purchases of
assets with an equivalent amount of public purchases is beyond the scope of this paper. Where
central banks perform emergency lending to financial institutions, or make asset purchases in highly
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illiquid markets at times of panic, it is more likely the resulting expansion of the central bank’s
balance sheet occurs at non-market prices. In any case, such balance-sheet policies are feasible and
provide a way of thinking about the effects of unconventional policy that is not circumscribed by
the well-known neutrality theorems.
3.2.2 Subsidized credit
An equivalent way of thinking about the unconventional monetary policy described above is in
terms of access to subsidized credit from either the central bank or government, ultimately financed
by lump-sum taxes. This is modelled formally as a proportional subsidy ςt to borrowing, with a
lump-sum tax Tt levied on the group of beneficiaries of the subsidy. In this way, the subsidy rate ςt
affects the demand for loans without having any direct fiscal consequences.
The budget identity of the young (2.3a) is replaced by:
Cy,t +
VtHm,t+1
Pt
+
(1 + ςt)QtBy,t
Pt
= Tt, [3.9]
with the required lump-sum tax −Tt given by:
Tt =
ςtQtBy,t
Pt
. [3.10]
Maximizing utility (2.1) subject to (3.9) (with individuals taking Tt as given) implies that borrowers’
Euler equation (2.4b) is replaced by:
(1 + ςt)Qt
PtCy,t
= δEt
[
1
Pt+1Cm,t+1
]
. [3.11]
Combining the budget identities (3.9) and (3.10) shows that (2.3a) continues to hold in equilibrium.
The Euler equation (3.11) is equivalent to (3.2) with τt = −ςt, that is, where the wedge τt in
borrowers’ Euler equation is equal to the negative of the subsidy rate ςt. Apart from replacing
(2.4b) with (3.2), all the equilibrium conditions of the economy are unchanged. As before, the
variable τt can be treated as the unconventional monetary policy instrument.
While the approach taken here to modelling balance-sheet policies and credit subsidies is highly
stylized, it provides a simple account of how the central bank can affect the interest rate paid by
borrowers relative to the interest rate received by savers. Alternative approaches are based on the
existence of a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors (Gertler and Karadi, 2011) or
a costly state verification problem (Clerc, Derviz, Mendicino, Moyen, Nikolov, Stracca, Suarez and
Vardoulakis, 2015). The central bank is not subject to these financial frictions, so it is able to
affect interest rate spreads through asset purchases. A common feature of these approaches and the
one used here is that the central-bank balance sheet is unconstrained, unlike the balance sheets of
private agents. One difference is that frictions such as moral hazard or costly state verification may
allow the central bank to make profits on its asset purchases.
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3.2.3 Macroprudential policies
While the previous two examples of unconventional monetary policies are designed to stimulate
lending without reducing the risk-free nominal interest rate, it is also possible to envisage unconven-
tional policies which do the opposite, namely restrict access to credit without raising the risk-free
nominal interest rate. Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in so-called ‘macroprudential’
policies that essentially have this aim (Galati and Moessner, 2013). While such policies are often
considered as distinct from monetary policy, it will be seen that their effects work in a closely related,
but opposite, manner to the unconventional monetary policies considered so far. For this reason,
macroprudential policies are analysed as a type of monetary policy, albeit of an unconventional kind.
Consider a common type of macroprudential policy whereby the central bank imposes a reg-
ulation limiting access to credit. This restriction is specified as a maximum loan-to-value ratio
for borrowers. Formally, the expected ratio of borrowers’ debt burden to the value of the housing
collateral they hold is limited to some policy-specified maximum χt:
−EtBy,t
Vt+1
≤ χt. [3.12]
Maximizing utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraints in (2.3) and the collateral constraint
(3.12) implies the first-order conditions:
Qt
PtCy,t
= δEt
[
1
Pt+1Cm,t+1
]
+ Et
[
Dt
Vt+1
]
, Dt ≥ 0, and
(
χt + Et
[
By,t
Vt+1
])
Dt = 0, [3.13]
where Dt is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the collateral constraint. These first-order con-
ditions along with (3.12) replace the Euler equation of borrowers in (2.4b), and Dt is an additional
endogenous variable. It turns out that these equations are equivalent to (3.2) with τt being a function
only of the macroprudential policy instrument χt:
τt = max {0, 1− χt/d∗} , and with Dt = τt
(
Et
[
PtCy,t
QtVt+1
])−1
, [3.14]
where d∗ is a positive constant. Since the solution for τt can be obtained without reference to any
variable other than χt, this means that τt itself can be directly interpreted as the policy instrument.
Hence, the equilibrium conditions change only in substituting (3.2) for (2.4b), noting that the new
variable Dt does not appear in the other equations.
With balance-sheet policies and subsidized credit, the value of τt was negative. Here, with
macroprudential policy, the borrowers’ Euler equation (3.2) has the same general form, but now τt
is non-negative. For high values of the loan-to-value ratio χt, the collateral constraint will not be
binding, in which case τt = 0 and the macroprudential policy has no effect. When the collateral
constraint is binding, the implied value of τt is strictly positive.
It would also be possible to analyse macroprudential policies that operate as taxes on lending.
These reduce the incentive to borrow, but do not impose any quantitative restrictions on borrowing.
This case is essentially the opposite of the credit subsidy analysed in section 3.2.2. If τt is the tax
rate on borrowing (with the proceeds rebated lump-sum to the group of borrowers as a whole), the
only change to the equilibrium conditions is that (3.2) replaces (2.4b). In this case, the positive
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value of τt can be interpreted directly as the tax rate.
3.3 Monetary policy
The following result summarizes the analysis so far:
Result 1 The various types of unconventional monetary policy considered in section 3.2 all imply
that borrowers’ Euler equation (2.4b) is replaced by (3.2), with no other alterations to the econ-
omy’s equilibrium conditions. The new variable τt appearing in (3.2) is determined solely by the
unconventional policy instruments.
Proof See appendix A.1. 
This result allows several different types of unconventional monetary policy to be analysed using a
common framework.
Turning first to what ought to be achieved through the use of monetary policy, note that in the
economic model of section 2 the conditions for Pareto efficiency include:
Cm,t
Cy,t−1
=
Co,t
Cm,t−1
, and
1
Cm,t
= δEt
[
αAt+1K
α−1
t+1 N
1−α
t+1
Co,t+1
]
. [3.15]
The first condition requires consumption smoothing and risk sharing across all cohorts of individuals.
The second condition requires that the return on any resources used for investment is sufficient to
compensate savers for delaying consumption. Since unconventional monetary policy only changes
borrowers’ Euler equation (2.4b), the results of Sheedy (2017a) show that the only way for monetary
policy to ensure the efficiency conditions in (3.15) hold is by aiming to stabilize the following two
ratios:
lt ≡ −QtBy,t
PtYt
, and st ≡ Yt − Ct
Yt
. [3.16]
The variable lt is new lending to households (for house purchases or consumption) relative to GDP,
and st is the national saving rate. The national saving rate st is also equal to the ratio of investment
to GDP given that the economy is closed. Given the equivalence between the efficiency conditions
(3.15) and stabilizing lt and st, if monetary policy is to support an efficient allocation of resources,
it must try to prevent booms and busts in lending to households and firms.
Before considering the real effects of monetary policy, note that there are two relevant inflation
rates in the economy: goods-price inflation $t, and asset-price (house-price) inflation pit:
$t ≡ Pt − Pt−1
Pt−1
, and pit ≡ Vt − Vt−1
Vt−1
. [3.17]
Using (3.1) and (3.17), borrowers’ Euler equation (3.2) can be written explicitly in terms of the
inflation rate $t+1 and the conventional and unconventional policy instruments it and τt:
1
Cy,t
=
δ
1− τtEt
[
(1 + it)
(1 +$t+1)Cm,t+1
]
. [3.18]
Ignoring the zero lower bound constraint, Sheedy (2017a) shows that a feedback rule of the type
it = (1 + pit)
ζµt − 1 for the conventional policy instrument, where µt denotes an exogenous state-
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contingent shift in the stance of conventional monetary policy, results in a unique equilibrium with
stable inflation if ζ > 1. The monetary policy stance µt is an exogenous stochastic process that can
be either interpreted as a reaction to the exogenous shocks hitting the economy (shocks to TFP At
in this simple model), or as a pure monetary policy shock.
While the feedback rule it = (1 + pit)
ζµt − 1 has the interest rate react only to one endoge-
nous variable, the inflation rate pit, the rule is more general than it might first appear. If some
equilibrium could be implemented using an alternative feedback rule, there is always an exogenous
state-contingent policy stance {µt} for which the rule it = (1 + pit)ζµt − 1 gives rise to the same
equilibrium (and which is the unique equilibrium with stable inflation when ζ > 1). This means that
except for questions of the determinacy of the equilibrium, it is without loss of generality to focus on
specifying the exogenous policy stance µt, rather than on the response of it to endogenous variables.
Different targets for monetary policy can then be implemented by choosing different policy stances
µt.
In this paper, the feedback rule for the nominal interest rate is modified so that it always respects
the zero lower bound constraint:
it = max{(1 + pit)ζµt − 1, 0}. [3.19]
The new unconventional monetary policy instrument τt is set according to the feedback rule:
τt = 1− 1
υt(1 + min{(1 + pit)ζµt − 1, 0}) , [3.20]
where υt is the exogenous stance of unconventional policy. When the zero lower bound constraint is
not binding, the policy rule sets the unconventional instrument τt in accordance with the exogenous
policy stance υt, but when the zero lower bound becomes binding, τt reacts endogenously to the
inflation rate pit to compensate for the inability to lower it below zero.
Monetary policy is specified as sequences of state-contingent policy stances {µt} and {υt} for the
conventional and unconventional instruments. Both of these policy stances are exogenous variables,
which could be either responses to the fundamental exogenous shocks faced by the economy (changes
in TFP At) or pure monetary policy shocks.
4 Unconventional monetary policy rules
This section studies what can be achieved through the choice of a rule for unconventional monetary
policy (a specification of the stance of unconventional policy {υt}). The analysis below takes the
stance of conventional monetary policy {µt} as given, as would be the case when the use of conven-
tional monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. The zero lower bound could become
binding if the interest rate required to achieve an inflation target using only conventional monetary
policy were to become negative following a shock (to TFP At in the model here).
As can be seen from equation (3.18), both conventional and unconventional monetary policy in-
struments appear in the economy’s equilibrium conditions, but the unconventional policy instrument
τt appears only in (3.18) (unlike the nominal interest rate it, which also appears in 2.4c through the
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bond price Qt). This suggests that both types of monetary policy should affect the equilibrium of
the economy, but that their effects might not be equivalent.
4.1 The control of inflation
The first finding is that unconventional monetary policy can be used to ensure there is a unique
stable equilibrium for inflation.
Result 2 Suppose the conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments are set in
accordance with the feedback rules (3.19) and (3.20) for given policy stances µt and υt. When
ζ > 1, there is a unique equilibrium with stable inflation.
Proof See appendix A.2. 
As explained in Woodford (2003), when the central bank conducts monetary policy using an interest
rate rule, the ‘Taylor principle’ is required to ensure a unique stable equilibrium for inflation. This
means that all else equal, the nominal interest rate must rise or fall more than any movement in
inflation. Since the zero lower bound limits the maximum amount that the nominal interest rate
can be cut, the Taylor principle cannot always be satisfied using conventional policy. This gives rise
to multiple equilibria, one of which is a ‘deflation trap’ (see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe,
2001). However, if monetary policy can be loosened through the unconventional instrument instead
of lowering interest rates when inflation falls, the Taylor principle can be restored and a unique
stable equilibrium is obtained.9
The ability of monetary policy to achieve a unique stable equilibrium for inflation is taken for
granted in what follows, where attention turns to what outcomes can actually be achieved through
the choice of the unconventional policy stance {υt}.
Result 3 Taking as given the stance of the conventional policy instrument {µt}, any target path
for the inflation rate $t or pit can be achieved through an appropriate choice of the unconventional
policy stance {υt}.
Proof See appendix A.3. 
This result shows that for the control of inflation, the unconventional policy instrument is in principle
a perfect substitute for conventional monetary policy. Intuitively, both types of policy instrument
affect the demand for loans at a given rate of inflation. By varying the unconventional policy
instrument appropriately, monetary policy can ensure the economy is in equilibrium at any target
rate of inflation. The result also confirms that the particular form of the feedback rule (3.19) in
9It might be objected that the unconventional monetary policy instrument τt is itself subject to a lower bound.
When τt is negative, this corresponds to the case of a credit subsidy or a central bank buying assets above the market
price. This has a fiscal cost, which was assumed to be met by lump-sum taxes. In practice, only distortionary
taxes are available to make up for central bank losses, which places a limit on the maximum size of unconventional
monetary policy interventions. If the restriction τt ≥ −k is imposed for some k ≥ 0 then the problem of multiple
equilibria returns.
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reacting to house-price inflation pit is without loss of generality because the same type of feedback
rule can be used to achieve any alternative nominal target (which would correspond to some state-
contingent sequence of house-price inflation {pit}).
In what follows, the stance of conventional monetary policy {µt} is restricted so that the nominal
interest rate is always bounded above zero in equilibrium (it > 0). It follows from (3.19) and (3.20)
that the unconventional monetary policy instrument is equal to the following in equilibrium:
τt = 1− 1
ut
. [4.1]
This means the actual value of the unconventional policy instrument τt will be determined entirely
by the exogenous unconventional policy stance {υt} on the equilibrium path.
4.2 The real effects of monetary policy
The results obtained so far provide no reason to prefer conventional to unconventional monetary
policy instruments since both can be equally well used to control inflation. However, this is not the
case when the real effects of the two policy instruments are considered.
The source of the real effects of monetary policy in the economic model is the presence of nomi-
nal contracts, specifically the nominal debt (mortgages) used to finance house purchases. Monetary
policy matters because it affects nominal house prices, and in particular, how nominal house prices
react to economic shocks (TFP shocks in the model). Since the nominal debt burden is predeter-
mined, fluctuations in nominal house prices have real effects on the balance sheets of borrowers
and lenders. Shocks to balance sheets affect relative consumption levels, and by changing the net
worth of lenders, also affect the real quantity of new loans received by borrowers. This in turn has
implications for the consumption levels of different cohorts of individuals. Finally, shocks to balance
sheets also influence the real quantity of investment that is financed, which affects production in
the economy.
The workings of the model are described in more detail in Sheedy (2017a). The old consume
all of their financial wealth. The middle-aged are the lenders in the economy, and their net worth
depends on the current value of the houses they bought when young and the amount of debt they
must repay. Given logarithmic utility (2.1), income and substitution effects cancel out for savers,
which implies the middle-aged will consume a constant fraction of their net worth. The remaining
fraction is lent to the young to finance purchases of houses and consumption goods, and to firms to
finance investment. This means the real supply of loans is a function only of the real net worth of
lenders, not interest rates or any other factors such as uncertainty about the future. The young are
borrowers, and for them income and substitution effects are reinforcing. This means that the demand
for loans is negatively related to interest rates, and also to uncertainty about the future value of
the houses that are bought using the loans. As explained earlier in section 3.2, the unconventional
policy instruments also affect the demand for loans independently of the risk-free nominal interest
rate.
Real house prices are determined in equilibrium by the real value of lending given the inelastic
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supply of houses and the dependence of homebuyers on mortgage financing. Equilibrium real interest
rates are determined in the market for loans. The supply of loans is interest inelastic, but shifts
with the net worth of lenders. The demand for loans is interest elastic and shifts with changes in
the probability distribution of future house prices. Changing the stance of unconventional monetary
policy also leads to a shift of the demand curve. Finally, inflation can be determined given its
relationship with the economy’s real variables and the stances of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy.
The following result gives the real effects of unexpected changes in the stances of conventional
and unconventional monetary policy µt and υt. These unexpected changes could be pure policy
shocks or responses to unexpected economic shocks (TFP shocks in the model).
Result 4 The real effects of an unexpected one-period loosening of the stances of conventional
monetary policy (lower µt) and unconventional monetary policy (lower υt) are shown in the table
below. The effects are reported for new lending lt and the national saving rate st (both defined
in 3.16), and the consumption-to-GDP ratios for the young, middle-aged, and old, as defined by
cy,t ≡ Cy,t/Yt, cm,t ≡ Cm,t/Yt, and co,t ≡ Co,t/Yt.
Variable lt+` st+` Yt+` cy,t+` cm,t+` co,t+`
Policy µt ↓ υt ↓ µt ↓ υt ↓ µt ↓ υt ↓ µt ↓ υt ↓ µt ↓ υt ↓ µt ↓ υt ↓
Time horizon (`)
0 + + + + 0 0 + + + + − −
1 0 − 0 − + + 0 − 0 − 0 +
≥ 2 0 0 0 0 + ? 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proof See appendix A.4. 
Looser conventional and unconventional monetary policy can both stimulate additional lending to
households and firms. Intuitively, both policy instruments affect asset-price inflation and thus have
real effects on balance sheets in the presence of nominal debt. Looser policy of either kind boosts
asset prices and improves the balance sheets of the middle-aged, whose lending to the next cohort of
households and firms is proportional to their net worth. This leads to a positive shift in the supply
of loans.
The consumption cm,t of the middle-aged relative to GDP is higher, reflecting the increase in net
worth. The consumption cy,t of the young is also higher as a consequence of increased lending lt.
There is also an increase in investment given the higher national saving rate st. The consumption
co,t of the old declines relative to GDP because investment and the consumption of all other cohorts
increase relative to GDP. This is a consequence of the declining real value of the pension wealth
held in nominal bonds.
The real effects of monetary policy on GDP Yt operate through investment in capital. Changes
in investment have a persistent effect on the future capital stock and output. There is no effect on
impact because of the one-period time-to-build. Owing to the three-period overlapping generations
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structure of the model, a shock to the net worth of the current cohort of lenders does not affect
the net worth of future lenders (relative to GDP). This is why conventional monetary policy has a
persistent effect only on GDP, not on other variables relative to GDP.
While conventional and unconventional policies have qualitatively identical real effects on impact,
the two types of monetary policy are not equivalent because their subsequent effects differ. A past
unconventional policy change pushes lending in the opposite direction in the subsequent time period,
which does not happen with conventional policy. Therefore, while expansionary unconventional
policy can stimulate lending in the short term, some of this increase in effectively pulled forward
from future periods.
The explanation for this finding is that unconventional monetary policy also shifts the demand
for loans at each risk-free nominal interest rate, in addition to the effect on the supply of loans that
it shares with conventional monetary policy. This means the equilibrium real interest rate is higher
than it would otherwise be when the same increase in borrowing is brought about directly through
a conventional reduction in the nominal interest rate. Thus, expansionary unconventional policy
leaves the balance sheets of those who will be providing loans in the future in a worse state than
expansionary conventional policy. This leads to a subsequent reversal in lending.
One way that the negative effects of unconventional monetary policy might be smaller than
argued here is if the central bank is able to make profits on its use of unconventional policy instru-
ments. This could occur if the central bank’s ability to allocate credit is not significantly lower than
that of private financial institutions while not being subject to the financial frictions faced by those
institutions. In that case, if the central bank distributes the profits it makes to borrowers then their
balance sheets will improve.
4.3 Achieving an efficient allocation of resources
To achieve an efficient allocation of resources in the economy described in section 2, monetary policy
needs to offset the credit cycle and stabilize the ratio of lending to GDP lt and the national saving
rate st. It is shown in Sheedy (2017a) that conventional monetary policy can do this, assuming it
does not violate the interest rate lower bound. The policy works by leaning against the effects of
TFP shocks on asset prices, ensuring that there is no amplification of those shocks through balance
sheets. By stabilizing house-price inflation, monetary policy can tame the credit cycle.
Since unconventional monetary policy can also be used to control asset-price inflation, it might
be thought that it too can be used to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, and thus come
to the rescue when conventional policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. However, because
of the differences in the real effects of unconventional policy described above, the unconventional
policy action taken now to stabilize the economy would destabilize it in the future. A corollary
is that there is no unconventional policy stance {υt} that can implement an efficient allocation of
resources.
Result 5 There is no stance of unconventional monetary policy {υt} that can stabilize the lending-
to-GDP ratio lt and the national saving rate st and thus achieve an efficient allocation of resources,
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unless an efficient allocation is already achieved through conventional policy.
Proof See appendix A.5. 
If unconventional monetary policy cannot achieve an efficient allocation of resources, what should
be done? Assessing the trade-offs in optimal policy requires an explicit objective function. Consider
a weighted sum of household utilities:
Wt0 =
∞∑
t=t0−2
ΩtEt0−1Ut. [4.2]
From this point onwards, the analysis is performed using a simplified version of the model where
there is no capital. This is the limiting case where the parameter α in the production function (2.6)
tends to zero. Even in this special case, exactly characterizing the optimal policy rule is complicated
owing to the trade-offs between stabilization now and stabilization in the future. This is analogous
to difficulties faced by forward guidance where it entails a commitment to set the conventional
policy instrument in the future at a different level from what would be warranted by the conditions
then prevailing (Campbell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano, 2012). Here, even without the issue of
commitment to future unconventional policy, past unconventional policy actions have a destabilizing
effect on current conditions.
Result 6 Choosing the stance of unconventional policy {υt} to maximize the weighted sum of
household utilities (4.2), the resulting policy is not entirely passive (τt 6= 0), but does not aim for
the same nominal target as the optimal conventional monetary policy unconstrained by the zero
lower bound.
Proof See appendix A.6. 
It is not possible to say more in general about optimal unconventional policy even in the context of
the simple model of this paper. The key message is that when switching from the conventional to
the unconventional policy instrument, the optimal target for monetary policy will most likely need
to change.
4.4 The distributional effects of unconventional policies
The distributional consequences of monetary policy have attracted much controversy in the years
following the financial crisis (for some recent evidence, see Doepke, Schneider and Selezneva, 2015).
If a policy instrument has large distributional effects, it becomes more difficult for policy to be set
according to a rule aiming at stabilizing the economy. Political pressure for discretionary action
seeking to exploit the distributional effects of policy will become harder for policymakers to resist.
Since the conventional instruments of monetary policy are known to have distributional effects,
the challenge of insulating central banks from political pressure would not appear to be specific to
times when unconventional policy is used. Nonetheless, debates about the distributional effects of
monetary policy have risen up the political agenda in the era of unconventional policy after the
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financial crisis. Is there any sense in which the instruments of unconventional monetary policy have
more potent distributional effects, and are thus more likely to result in political controversy?
When the instruments of unconventional monetary policy were introduced into the model in
section 3, recall that by construction, all of those unconventional policies have no direct distributional
consequences (lump-sum taxes or transfers were used to offset any direct distributional effects). With
conventional policy, changes in the nominal interest rate do directly affect the nominal transfer
made by borrowers to lenders when a loan is repaid. Hence, there should be no presumption that
unconventional policy necessarily has stronger distributional effects than conventional policy in the
economic model used here.
To address this issue satisfactorily, it is necessary to think about any distributional effects fol-
lowing from monetary policy’s effect on the economy’s equilibrium. Consider first a benchmark case
where there is only a conventional monetary policy instrument and no zero lower bound constraint.
It is shown in Sheedy (2017a) that depending on the weights assigned to different cohorts of individ-
uals in (4.2), social welfare-maximizing monetary policy may or may not be swayed by distributional
concerns. In some cases, monetary policy is used only to achieve an efficient allocation of resources,
while in other cases, even though it is feasible to achieve an efficient allocation, monetary policy
sacrifices this to pursue distributional goals.
To analyse the distributional consequences of unconventional monetary policy, suppose that a
policymaker can set both the unconventional and conventional policy instruments (ignoring the zero
lower bound constraint) to maximize the weighted sum of individuals’ utilities in (4.2).
Result 7 Suppose the stances {µt} and {υt} of conventional and unconventional policy are jointly
determined to maximize the welfare function (4.2) for some weights Ωt on different cohorts of
individuals. The conventional policy stance is always set to stabilize asset-price inflation irrespective
of the weights Ωt. This action is what would be needed to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.
The stance of unconventional policy is independent of the shocks hitting the economy and depends
only on the weights Ωt assigned to different cohorts.
Proof See appendix A.7. 
The result suggests that it is actually the unconventional policy instrument which has the stronger
distributional effects. If both instruments were available because the zero lower bound is not binding,
a separation principle applies whereby the conventional policy instrument is used solely to achieve
economic efficiency, and the unconventional instrument is used solely to pursue distributional goals.
This finding suggests that it will be more difficult to insulate monetary policy rules from political
pressure when unconventional policy instruments are used.
4.5 Pitfalls of the natural interest rate
Given that the use of unconventional monetary policy instruments has drawbacks, there has been
much discussion of when economic conditions will allow for a ‘normalization’ of monetary policy, that
is, a return to the use of conventional policy instruments. The concept of a ‘natural’ rate of interest
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has taken on an important role in these discussions (see, for example, Williams, 2016) because this
determines, via the Fisher equation, whether a given target rate of inflation is consistent with a
positive nominal interest rate. A natural interest rate that is too low means any positive nominal
interest rate would be too high, and monetary policy must rely on unconventional instruments
instead.
The natural interest rate is usually defined as the real interest rate consistent with desired saving
equal to desired investment (or market clearing more generally). In the models typically used by
central banks for monetary policy analysis (see, for example, Woodford, 2003), the natural rate of
interest is determined by the economy’s fundamentals and is independent of monetary policy. The
presence of sticky prices or wages will mean that the actual real interest rate might be different from
the natural interest rate in the short run.
If the natural interest rate is to provide a useful benchmark for when to normalize monetary
policy, it is necessary that the natural interest rate is indeed independent of monetary policy. While
this is typically the case in models with complete financial markets, even in the simple model of
incomplete financial markets in this paper, the market-clearing real interest rate does depend on
the conduct of monetary policy.
Result 8 The market-clearing real interest rate (‘natural’ interest rate) %t depends on the stances of
conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Unexpectedly expansionary conventional policy
lowers %t, while expansionary unconventional policy has an ambiguous effect on %t.
Proof See appendix A.8. 
The mechanism through which the market-clearing real interest rate depends on monetary policy
is the effect of changes in nominal asset prices on the balance sheets of lenders, and the effect of
unconventional policy on incentives to borrow in addition to the risk-free nominal interest rate.
These effects shift the supply of loans and the demand for loans and influence the market-clearing
real interest rate. One consequence is that the concept of a natural rate of interest may be a poor
guide to policy and should be used with greater caution.
5 Avoiding the need for unconventional monetary policies
The arguments put forward in section 4 suggest that unconventional monetary policy instruments
may be a poor substitute for conventional ones. If it is difficult to design and put in place rules with
desirable properties specified in terms of unconventional policy instruments, this naturally leads to
the question of whether the need for unconventional instruments could be reduced by a change of
monetary policy strategy. Specifically, are some monetary targets easier to implement using purely
conventional instruments?
Consider two different versions of inflation targeting. First, the standard form of inflation tar-
geting where the target is stated purely in terms of the prices of goods, not assets. Second, an
alternative version of inflation targeting that aims to stabilize asset prices (house prices in the
model) rather than goods prices.
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For the economic model studied in this paper, Sheedy (2017a) shows that an efficient allocation
of resources can be achieved if the central bank is able to use conventional monetary policy to
stabilize asset-price inflation. This paper has established that the same policy implemented using
unconventional policy does not attain economic efficiency, thus it is better to use the conventional
instrument. But is it actually feasible to hit the target using conventional policy instruments if the
nominal interest rate is subject to a zero lower bound?
Result 9 A monetary policy that targets any non-negative rate of house-price inflation (pit = p¯i ≥ 0)
can be implemented without unconventional instruments (τt = 0) and without violating the zero
lower bound on the nominal interest rate (it ≥ 0), irrespective of the size of the TFP shocks hitting
the economy. If the target is instead for goods-price inflation ($t = $¯), the zero lower bound will
always bind for some realizations of shocks.
Proof See appendix A.9. 
This surprising result states that asset-price inflation targeting can be implemented without the risk
of a binding zero lower bound, unlike goods-price inflation targeting. While this very strong result
may be specific to the simple model studied here, intuition suggests that any successful attempt
to stabilize nominal asset-price inflation cannot require large changes in nominal interest rates in
equilibrium. Since asset prices are present discounted values, large swings in nominal interest rates
would themselves destabilize asset prices. Consequently, the range of interest rates consistent with
stable asset prices is likely to be smaller than the range required to keep goods prices stable.
In the case of goods-price inflation targeting, the range of nominal interest rates that might be
required to achieve the target using only conventional instruments is basically determined by the
range of the natural interest rate plus the inflation target. It has been noted above that the economic
model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets implies the market-clearing real
interest rate is not independent of monetary policy. It is therefore interesting to ask whether the
standard version of inflation targeting itself contributes to an economic environment where the
market-clearing real interest rate might fall to a point where the zero lower bound becomes binding.
Assume that the level of TFP At follows a random walk (allowing for drift). In this special
case, the market-clearing real interest rate in a representative-agent version of the economic model
would always be constant, so it would be easy to implement goods-price inflation targeting without
facing a zero lower bound problem. However, with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial
markets, it turns out that the market-clearing real interest rate is lower on average and more volatile
under goods-price inflation targeting than it would be under asset-price inflation targeting. A lower
and more volatile market-clearing real interest rate both increase the risk of the interest rate lower
bound becoming binding for a given level of the inflation target.
Result 10 Suppose TFP At follows a random walk with drift and let %t denote the market-clearing
real interest rate. Under a policy of goods-price inflation targeting ($t = $¯), the mean E[%t] is lower
and the variance Var[%t] is higher than under a policy of asset-price inflation targeting (pit = p¯i).
Proof See appendix A.10 
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In an economy with nominal debt contracts, if monetary policy ignores fluctuations in asset-price
inflation and focuses only on goods-price inflation then this will lead to TFP shocks having an
amplified effect on borrowers’ and lenders’ balance sheets. This gives rise to larger shifts in the supply
of loans, which entails larger fluctuations in the market-clearing real interest rate. Furthermore,
borrowing to buy houses is more risky if asset-price fluctuations are neglected by monetary policy.
This leads to a precautionary reduction in the demand for loans, implying a lower market-clearing
real interest rate on average.
6 Concluding remarks
This essay has discussed some of the difficulties and drawbacks of devising and following rules for
the unconventional instruments of monetary policy. A simple economic model was used to show
how various types of unconventional policy instruments are less effective at stabilizing the economy
than conventional instruments, and also give rise to larger redistributional effects. To avoid these
problems, central banks would need to follow monetary policy strategies that are less likely to
require unconventional policy instruments. This essay suggests a reform to inflation targeting to
give greater weight to asset prices, which it is argued would reduce the need to use unconventional
policy instruments in the future. For monetary policy to go back to being conventional in its
instruments, it needs to become unconventional in its targets.
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A Derivations of the results
A.1 Proof of Result 1
Introducing unconventional monetary policy instruments has been shown to change only one of the equi-
librium conditions of the basic model from Sheedy (2017a) in section 2. The borrowers’ Euler equation
(2.4b) is replaced by (3.2), which contains the unconventional policy instrument τt. With all other equi-
librium conditions unchanged, Steps 1–3 and Step 5 of Sheedy (2017a) continue to hold. Substituting the
expressions for the consumption shares cy,t ≡ Cy,t/Yt and cm,t ≡ Cm,t/Yt and the ex-post real return rt on
bonds (defined by 1 + rt = (Pt−1/Pt)/Qt−1) into (3.2):(
δψ
1 + δψ
κ
κ+ dt
)−1
=
δ
1− τtEt
[(
(κ+ dt)dt+1
λ(κ+ dt+1)
)(
1
1 + δψ
κ
κ+ dt+1
)−1]
,
where dt ≡ −By,t−1/(VtHt) denotes the amount of outstanding debt relative to the value of houses. The
terms ψ is shown in Sheedy (2017a) to be a constant that depends on the discount factor δ and θ ≡ Θ′(1).
The constants λ and κ are defined by λ ≡ 1/(1−ψ) and κ ≡ (1 + δψ)/(δ(1−ψ)). Simplifying the equation
and using the definition of β (another constant from Sheedy (2017a) that depends on δ and θ) leads to:
Etdt+1 =
λ
β
(1− τt). [A.1.1]
This result replaces Step 4 in Sheedy (2017a). Substituting dt+1 = λ(1 + it)/(1 + pit+1) into the above
implies:
1 + it
1− τt =
1
βEt[(1 + pit+1)−1]
. [A.1.2]
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and hence:
dt =
λ
β
(1− τt−1)t, where t = (1 + pit)
−1
Et−1[(1 + pit)−1]
, [A.1.3]
which satisfies Et−1t = 1.
Now consider the derivation of (3.2) and (3.14) in the case of the macroprudential policy instrument.
Define a variable τt as follows:
τt = DtEt
[
PtCy,t
QtVt+1
]
. [A.1.4]
Observe that the first equation in (3.13) implies (3.2) holds in terms of the new variable τt, though τt is an
endogenous variable. This replaces borrowers’ bond Euler equation in (2.4b), noting that the equilibrium
conditions must be augmented by additional equations because (3.2) refers to the new endogenous variable
τt.
It is clear from the definition (A.1.4) that τt ≥ 0 if and only if Dt ≥ 0, and τt = 0 if and only if Dt = 0.
Using Ht = 1 and the definition of dt+1 it follows that dt+1 = −By,t/Vt+1. Hence, together with the link
between τt and Dt in (A.1.4), the macroprudential constraint (3.12) and the second and third optimality
conditions in (3.13) are equivalent to:
Etdt+1 ≤ χt, τt ≥ 0, and τt (χt − Etdt+1) = 0. [A.1.5]
Therefore, the complete set of equilibrium conditions has (2.4b) replaced by (3.2), and also adds the
conditions in (A.1.5). There is an additional endogenous variable τt, along with the new exogenous policy
variable χt.
Note that Step 1 through to Step 3 in Sheedy (2017a) do not use the borrowers’ bond Euler equation
in (2.4b). Furthermore, since they do not make use of any equilibrium conditions referring to the new
variable τt, they are unchanged in this version of the model. Using these steps and following exactly the
same reasoning as above, (A.1.1) must hold in terms of the endogenous variable τt. This equation can be
used to substitute for the terms involving Etdt+1 in (A.1.5) to obtain:
λ
β
(1− τt) ≤ χt, τt ≥ 0, and τt
(
χt − λ
β
(1− τt)
)
= 0. [A.1.6]
Observe that these conditions include only the new variable τt and the exogenous policy variable χt. The
first condition is equivalent to τt ≥ 1 − (β/λ)χt and the third condition to τt(τt − (1 − (β/λ)χt)) = 0.
Together with τt ≥ 0, the unique solution of this system of linear equations and inequalities is:
τt = max
{
0, 1− β
λ
χt
}
, [A.1.7]
and since 0 < χt ≤ ∞, the solution satisfies 0 ≤ τt < 1. It follows that the solution for the endogenous
variable τt can be obtained with reference only to the single exogenous variable χt. This confirms the
expression for τt in (3.14) with d
∗ = λ/β, and the equation for Dt follows immediately from the definition
(A.1.4). This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Result 2
Using equations (3.19) and (3.20) for the conventional and unconventional policy instruments:
1 + it
1− τt =
1 + max{(1 + pit)ζµt − 1, 0}
1−
(
1− 1
υt(1+min{(1+pit)ζµt−1,0})
) = max{(1 + pit)ζµt, 1}υt min{(1 + pit)ζµt, 1},
which uses 1 + max{(1 + pit)ζµt − 1, 0} = max{(1 + pit)ζµt, 1} and 1 + min{(1 + pit)ζµt − 1, 0} = min{(1 +
pit)
ζµt, 1}. It follows that:
1 + it
1− τt = (1 + pit)
ζµtυt,
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because max{(1 + pit)ζµt, 1}min{(1 + pit)ζµt, 1} = (1 + pit)ζµt. Substituting this into (A.1.2):
βµtυt(1 + pit)
ζEt[(1 + pit+1)
−1] = 1. [A.2.1]
Since both µt and τt are exogenous stochastic processes, the equation above is isomorphic to the expecta-
tional difference equation considered in Step 9 of Sheedy (2017a) with the exogenous conventional monetary
policy stance µt replaced by the combined exogenous policy stance µ˜t ≡ µtυt. When ζ > 1, the unique
stable solution for house-price inflation pit is therefore given by:
1 + pit =
β
1
1−ζ
m˜t
, where m˜t ≡ µ˜
1
ζ
t
(
Etµ˜
1
ζ
t+1
(
Et+1µ˜
1
ζ
t+2 (· · · )
1
ζ
) 1
ζ
) 1
ζ
and µ˜t ≡ µtυt, [A.2.2]
where the variable m˜t is determined by the current and expected future stances of conventional and un-
conventional monetary policy. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Result 3
Consider a state-contingent path of house-price inflation {p˜it}, and a state-contingent sequence of conven-
tional monetary policy stances {µt}. Setting the stance of unconventional monetary policy:
υt =
1
βµt(1 + p˜i)ζEt [(1 + p˜it+1)−1]
,
comparison with (A.2.1) shows that pit = p˜it is the unique stable equilibrium. Similarly, taking the house-
price inflation path {p˜it} implied by a path of goods-price inflation {$˜t}, the unique equilibrium is $t = $˜t.
This completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Result 4
Given the solution for house-price inflation in (A.2.2), the implied debt ratio is:
dt =
λ
β
(1− τt−1)t, where t = m˜t
Et−1m˜t
.
Using equation (4.1) to write 1− τt in terms of υt:
dt =
λ
β
t
υt−1
. [A.4.1]
Step 3 from Sheedy (2017a) remains valid in this version of the model. By substituting the expression for
dt from (A.4.1) into the formula for the new lending ratio lt:
lt =
βλ
βκ+ λ tυt−1
, [A.4.2]
and the consumption ratios cy,t, cm,t, and co,t can be obtained in the same way:
cy,t =
δψ
1 + δψ
(
βκ
βκ+ λ tυt−1
)
, cm,t =
1
1 + δψ
(
βκ
βκ+ λ tυt−1
)
, and co,t =
λ tυt−1
βκ+ λ tυt−1
. [A.4.3]
From (A.2.2), t depends positively on current and expected future value of µt and υt. The result in (A.4.2)
implies that an unexpected lowering of µt reduces t and thus increases lt, without having any effect on
future t+` and hence lt+`. An unexpected lowering of υt also reduces t with changing any future t+`.
However, from (A.4.2), υt also has a direct positive effect on lt+1. The surprise reduction in υt thus raises
lt but lowers lt+1. Using (A.4.3), the effects on cy,t and cm,t go in the same direction as those on lt, and
the effects on co,t go in the opposite direction.
The results can be extended to an economy with capital by following the same method as in Result
9 of Sheedy (2017a). The effects of surprise changes in µt and υt on the saving rate st are qualitatively
the same as for lt. Any effect on st changes the investment/GDP ratio and has a persistent effect on the
subsequent capital stock and GDP. This completes the proof.
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A.5 Proof of Result 5
Step 3 of Sheedy (2017a) yields an expression for lt which remains valid here:
lt =
λ
κ+ dt
. [A.5.1]
Suppose that a combination of conventional monetary policy {µt} and unconventional monetary policy
{τt} were to imply a constant ratio of lending to GDP lt = l. According to (A.5.1), this is possible only
if dt = d, where d = (λ/l) − κ is a constant. Clearly, this can happen only if Etdt+1 = d. Since (A.4.1)
implies Etdt+1 = (λ/β)/υt because Ett+1 = 1, a necessary condition is that unconventional policy is such
that υt = υ, where υ = λ/βd. With dt = d and υt = υ, equation (A.4.1) requires d = (λ/β)(t/υ), and
given that υ = λ/βd, this is possible only if t = 1.
Since υt = υ at all times and in all states, µ˜t = µtυt is proportional to µt. It then follows from equation
(A.2.2) that m˜t = υmt, where mt is the equivalent of m˜t in (A.2.2) when µ˜t is replaced by µt. Given
the expression for t in (A.1.3), the conventional and unconventional policy combination {µt, υt} achieves
t = 1 if and only if this would be attained in the absence of unconventional policy (υt = 1). It follows that
there is no unconventional monetary policy which can achieve a constant ratio lt = l unless conventional
monetary policy would already achieve this objective in the absence of any unconventional policy. An
exactly equivalent argument applies to the national saving rate st.
The criteria for Pareto efficiency in Step 7 of Sheedy (2017a) remain valid here, so cm,t/cy,t−1 =
co,t/cm,t−1 is necessary for an allocation to be efficient. The results in Step 3 are unaffected by the intro-
duction of the unconventional policy instrument, hence the efficiency condition is equivalent to:
1
1+δψ
(
κ
κ+dt
)
δψ
1+δψ
(
κ
κ+dt−1
) = dtκ+dt
1
1+δψ
(
κ
κ+dt−1
) .
By cancelling common terms, this requires dt = d, where d = κ/(δψ(1 + δψ)). Following the same steps
as above shows that a conventional and unconventional monetary policy combination {µt, υt} results in
an equilibrium with this property only if the same conventional policy stance {µt} would already achieve
dt = d in the absence of any unconventional policy (υt = 1). There is thus no efficient allocation that can
be attained through the use of unconventional monetary policy. This completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Result 6
The welfare function Wt0 is defined in equation (4.2). Since Hm,t = 1 in equilibrium, the utility function
Ut from (2.1) implies:
Ut = logCy,t + δEt logCm,t+1 + δ
2Et logCo,t+2 + t.i.p.,
where t.i.p. denotes terms independent of monetary policy (both conventional and unconventional). Since
aggregate output is exogenous in the special case α = 0, it follows that logCτ,t = log cτ,t + t.i.p. for all
τ ∈ {y,m, o} where cτ,t = Cτ,t/Yt is a ratio of consumption to output:
Ut = log cy,t + δEt log cm,t+1 + δ
2Et log co,t+2 + t.i.p.. [A.6.1]
Substituting this into the welfare function (4.2):
Wt0 =
∞∑
t=t0−2
ΩtEt0−1
[
log cy,t + δEt log cm,t+1 + δ
2Et log co,t+2
]
+ t.i.p.
=
∞∑
t=t0
Et0−1
[
Ωt log cy,t + δΩt−1 log cm,t + δ2Ωt−2 log co,t
]
+ t.i.p.. [A.6.2]
The results in Step 3 of Sheedy (2017a) remain valid here, so the equilibrium consumption ratios are:
cy,t =
δψ
1 + δψ
(
κ
κ+ dt
)
, cm,t =
1
1 + δψ
(
κ
κ+ dt
)
, and co,t =
(
dt
κ+ dt
)
. [A.6.3]
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Substituting these expressions into (A.6.2) leads to:
Wt0 =
∞∑
t=t0
ΨtEt0−1
[
(1− ωt) log κ
κ+ dt
+ ωt log
dt
κ+ dt
]
+ t.i.p.,
with the variables Ψt and ωt being defined in terms of the welfare weights Ωt assigned to each generation:
ωt =
δ2Ωt−2
Ωt + δΩt−1 + δ2Ωt−2
, and Ψt = Ωt + δΩt−1 + δ2Ωt−2. [A.6.4]
Since Ωt must be measurable with respect to date-(t0−1) information, this property is inherited by ωt and
Ψt. Adding and subtracting an arbitrary constant leads to the following expression for the welfare function:
Wt0 =
∞∑
t=t0
ΨtEt0−1Wt+t.i.p., where Wt = (1−ωt)Et−1 log
κ+ λ/β
κ+ dt
+ωtEt−1 log
(1 + βκ/λ)dt
κ+ dt
. [A.6.5]
The period-t welfare function is seen to depend only on the variable dt and the relative welfare weight ωt.
Taking as given an arbitrary stance of conventional monetary policy {µt}, the problem of choosing
unconventional policy {υt} to maximize the welfare function Wt0 does not have an analytic solution. To
provide an illustrative example, first consider a sequence of welfare weights {Ωt} proportional to γt for
some constant 0 < γ < 1. Using (A.6.4), it follows that:
ωt = ω =
δ2
γ2 + γδ+ δ2
, and Ψt =
(
1 +
δ
γ
+
δ2
γ2
)
γt.
This implies the period-t welfare function is a time-invariant function of dt, and that welfare at different
dates is discounted by a term proportional to γt. Taking a second-order approximation of welfare around
the non-stochastic steady state, the negative of the welfare function is approximately proportional to the
following loss function:
Lt0 =
1
2
∞∑
t=t0
γt−t0Et0−1d
2
t , [A.6.6]
where dt denotes the log deviation of dt from its non-stochastic steady state. In what follows, it is assumed
that the first-order conditions are sufficient to characterize a global maximum of the welfare function (the
requirements for this are discussed in Sheedy, 2017a), and thus that the optimal unconventional policy
can be approximated by minimizing the loss function (A.6.6) subject to first-order approximations of the
equilibrium conditions connecting monetary policy to the debt ratio dt.
Using (4.1), (A.1.3), and (A.2.2) the first-order approximation of the debt ratio is given by:
dt = t − υt−1, where t = m˜t − Et−1m˜t−1, and hence dt = m˜t − Et−1m˜t − υt−1, [A.6.7]
where t, υt, and m˜t denote the log deviations of t, υt, and m˜t from their non-stochastic steady-state
values. The equation for m˜t in (A.2.2) can be written recursively as Etm˜t+1 = m˜
ζ
t/(µtυt), which can be
log linearized as follows:
m˜t = ζ
−1Etm˜t+1 + ζ−1(υt + µt), [A.6.8]
with µt denoting the log deviation of µt from its steady-state value. The conventional monetary policy
stance µt is taken as given here, with the unconventional policy stance υt being the choice variable. The
loss function (A.6.6) can be minimized subject to the constraints in (A.6.7) and (A.6.8) by setting up the
Lagrangian:
Lt0 =
∞∑
t=t0
γt−t0Et0−1
[
d2t
2
− ξt (dt + υt−1 − m˜t + Et−1m˜t)− ϕt
(
m˜t − ζ−1υt − ζ−1µt − ζ−1Etm˜t+1
)]
,
where ξt and ϕt are the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the two constraints (scaled by the discount
factor γt−t0 without loss of generality). The first-order conditions of the constrained minimization problem
are:
dt = ξt, ϕt = γ
−1ζ−1ϕt−1 + ξt − Et−1ξt, and ζ−1ϕt = γEtξt+1. [A.6.9]
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The final equation implies γ−1ζ−1ϕt−1 = Et−1ξt, and substituting this into the second equation yields
ϕt = ξt. Using the first equation to write dt+1 = ξt+1, the third equation implies ζ
−1ϕt = γEtdt+1. Since
the equilibrium condition for dt+1 in (A.6.7) implies Etdt+1 = −υt, it follows that ϕt = ξt = γζυt. Finally,
with dt = ξt, the optimal choice of υt must satisfy:
dt = −γζυt, and Etυt+1 = γ−1ζ−1υt. [A.6.10]
Iterating forwards the equation (A.6.8) for m˜t:
m˜t = mt +
∞∑
`=0
ζ−(`+1)Etυt+`, with mt =
∞∑
`=0
ζ−(`+1)Etµt+`, [A.6.11]
where mt depends only on the exogenous stance {µt} of conventional monetary policy. The second equation
in (A.6.10) implies Etυt+` = (γζ)
−`υt and hence:
m˜t = mt +
ζ−1
1− (γζ2)−1υt = mt +
γζ
γζ2 − 1υt,
assuming that γζ2 > 1. The unexpected components of the left- and right-hand sides must be equal:
m˜t − Et−1m˜t = (mt − Et−1mt) + γζ
γζ2 − 1(υt − Et−1υt). [A.6.12]
Note that (A.6.7) implies dt−Et−1dt = m˜t−Et−1m˜t, and the first equation in (A.6.10) implies dt−Et−1dt =
−γζ(υt − Et−1υt). Together, it follows that:
−γζ(υt − Et−1υt) = (mt − Et−1mt) + γζ
γζ2 − 1(υt − Et−1υt),
and therefore:
υt − Et−1υt = −γ−1ζ−1(1− (γζ2)−1)(mt − Et−1mt). [A.6.13]
In combination with the second equation from (A.6.10), the solution for υt is:
υt = γ
−1ζ−1υt−1 − γ−1ζ−1(1− (γζ2)−1)(mt − Et−1mt). [A.6.14]
Since υt 6= 0, the optimal choice of the unconventional policy instrument is not entirely passive. Note that
by combining (A.6.12) and (A.6.13):
m˜t − Et−1m˜t = (1− (γζ2)−1)(mt − Et−1mt),
and so m˜t 6= Et−1m˜t whenever mt 6= Et−1mt. It follows that the optimal use of the unconventional policy
instrument will not stabilize the same nominal target as when the conventional policy instrument is set
optimally in the absence of a binding zero lower bound constraint. This completes the proof.
A.7 Proof of Result 7
Using equations (4.1), (A.1.3), and (A.2.2), the value of the debt ratio dt in equilibrium is:
dt =
λ
β
t
υt−1
, where t =
m˜t
Et−1m˜t
, [A.7.1]
where Et−1t = 1. The variable m˜t depends on the policy stances µt and υt as shown in equation (A.2.2).
The period-t welfare function Wt from (A.6.5) is:
Wt = Et−1
(1− ωt) log κ+ λβ
κ+ λβ
t
υt−1
+ ωt log
(
κ+ λβ
)
t
υt−1
κ+ λβ
t
υt−1
 ,
and by using βκ/λ = δψ(1 + δψ) this can be written as:
Wt = Et−1
[
(1− ωt) log 1 + δψ+ δ
2ψ2
(δψ+ δ2ψ2) + tυt−1
+ ωt log
(1 + δψ+ δ2ψ2) tυt−1
(δψ+ δ2ψ2) + tυt−1
]
.
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The period-t welfare function can be simplified as follows:
Wt = Et−1
[
ωt log t − log((δψ+ δ2ψ2)υt−1) + (1− ωt) log υt−1 + log(1 + δψ+ δ2ψ2)
]
. [A.7.2]
Given this equation and (A.6.5), and the determination of the variable m˜t in (A.2.2), maximizing the welfare
function Wt0 is equivalent to maximizing Wt in (A.7.2) for all t ≥ t0, subject to Et−1t = 1. Conditional
on a particular relative welfare weight ωt, this maximization problem has the following general form:
max
,υ
ES(, υ), subject to E = 1, with S(, υ) = ω log − log((δψ+ δ2ψ2)υ+ ) + (1− ω) log υ,
where the formula for S(, υ) is obtained from (A.7.2) after dropping the final constant. Note that in this
maximization problem,  is a random variable (with mean one), whereas υ is not stochastic.
Using the proof of Result 4 in Sheedy (2017a), the optimal choice of  is non-stochastic ( = 1) if:
ω
1− ω (δψ+ δ
2ψ2)υ ≥ 1. [A.7.3]
Conditional on  = 1, the partial derivative of S(, υ) with respect to υ is:
∂S(, υ)
∂υ
=
1− ω
υ
− δψ+ δ
2ψ2
(δψ+ δ2ψ2) + 1
.
This is positive for small υ and equals zero at a unique value of υ, which satisfies:
ω
1− ω (δψ+ δ
2ψ2)υ = 1,
confirming that (A.7.3) holds. This means the optimal choice of t is always equal to one, while the optimal
υt−1 can be obtained by rearranging the equation above:
υt−1 =
(1− ωt)
(δψ+ δ2ψ2)ωt
,
which depends only on parameters and the welfare weights {Ωt} through ωt. The choice of t = 1 can be
implemented by setting µt = µ˜/υt for any constant µ˜. With t = 1, house-price inflation is stabilized through
conventional monetary policy, while unconventional monetary policy is used to pursue the distributional
goals implicit in the welfare weights {Ωt}. This completes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Result 8
Using Step 3 of Sheedy (2017a), the equilibrium ex-post real return on bonds rt+1 between t and t+ 1 is:
1 + rt+1 =
(1 + gt+1)(κ+ dt)dt+1
λ(κ+ dt+1)
, [A.8.1]
where gt is the growth rate of real GDP. The equilibrium debt ratio dt is:
dt =
λ
β
(1− τt−1)t, where t = m˜t
Et−1m˜t
, [A.8.2]
and the variable m˜t is defined by:
m˜t =
(
µt
1− τt
) 1
ζ
Et
( µt+1
1− τt+1
) 1
ζ
(
Et+1
[(
µt+2
1− τt+2
) 1
ζ
(· · · ) 1ζ
]) 1
ζ

1
ζ
. [A.8.3]
The natural real interest rate is the market-clearing real interest rate %t, which is the ex-ante real return
on bonds:
1 + %t = Et[1 + rt+1]. [A.8.4]
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Substituting (A.8.2) into (A.8.1) and that into (A.8.4):
1 + %t =
κ+ (λ/β)(1− τt−1)t
λ
Et
[
(1 + gt+1)(λ/β)(1− τt)t+1
κ+ (λ/β)(1− τt)t+1
]
=
βκ+ λ(1− τt−1)t
βλ
Et
[
λ(1 + gt+1)t+1
βκ
1−τt + λt+1
]
. [A.8.5]
Unexpectedly expansionary conventional monetary policy (lower µt) implies m˜t and t are lower according
to (A.8.2) and (A.8.3), but there is no effect on future t+`. Holding constant unconventional monetary
policy τt, equation (A.8.5) implies that the natural real interest rate is reduced.
An unexpected loosening of unconventional monetary policy (lower τt) also implies m˜t and t are lower
according to (A.8.2) and (A.8.3), with no effect on future t+`. Using equation (A.8.5), while lower t
reduces %t, the term inside the conditional expectation is decreasing in τt. The relative sizes of these effects
depend on ζ and the realizations of τt−1 and t+1, so the overall effect on %t is ambiguous. This completes
the proof.
A.9 Proof of Result 9
Using Step 3 of Sheedy (2017a), the ratio of house-price pit+1 to goods-price inflation $t+1 between t and
t+ 1 is:
1 + pit
1 +$t
=
(1 + gt+1)(κ+ dt)
(κ+ dt+1)
. [A.9.1]
The real return on bonds is given by the Fisher equation in terms of the nominal interest rate it and the
goods-price inflation rate $t+1:
1 + rt+1 =
1 + it
1 +$t+1
. [A.9.2]
Using the expression for the ex-post real return rt+1 from (A.8.1) and combining this with (A.9.1) and
(A.9.2):
1 + it
1 + pit+1
=
dt+1
λ
. [A.9.3]
If unconventional monetary policy instruments are not used, the equilibrium debt ratio dt+1 is given by:
dt =
λ
β
t, where t =
(1 + pit)
−1
Et−1[(1 + pit)−1]
, [A.9.4]
where Et−1t = 1.
Suppose that monetary policy is able to achieve a target for house-price inflation pit = p¯i for all t for
some p¯i > 0. It follows from (A.9.4) that t = 1, and hence dt = λ/β. Substituting pit = p¯i and dt = λ/β
into (A.9.3) implies:
1 + it =
λ/β
λ
(1 + p¯i) =
1 + p¯i
β
,
which is strictly greater than 1 because p¯i > 0 and 0 < β < 1. This demonstrates that any positive target
for house-price inflation can be implemented without violating the zero lower bound (it ≥ 0).
Now consider a target (positive or negative) for goods-price inflation: $t = $¯. If this target is achieved,
the Fisher equation (A.9.2) implies that:
1 + rt+1 = Et[1 + rt+1]. [A.9.5]
Using this equation and the formula for rt+1 from (A.8.1), it follows that:
(1 + gt+1)dt+1
(κ+ dt+1)
= Zt, [A.9.6]
where Zt is measurable with respect to date-t information. By rearranging this equation and taking
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expectations conditional on date-t information:
1 + Etgt+1
Zt
= 1 + κEtd
−1
t+1 > 1 +
κ
Etdt+1
= 1 +
κ
λ/β
=
λ+ βκ
λ
,
which applies Jensen’s inequality to the convex function d−1t+1. The inequality implies:
Zt <
λ(1 + Etgt+1)
λ+ βκ
. [A.9.7]
Substituting (A.9.6) into (A.8.1), and then substituting that and $t = $¯ into (A.9.2):
1 + it =
(1 + $¯)(κ+ dt)
λ
Zt. [A.9.8]
Using the result in (A.9.7), it follows that:
1 + it <
(1 + $¯)(1 + Etgt+1)(κ+ dt)
λ+ βκ
=
(
(1 + $¯)(1 + Etgt+1)
β
)(
κ+ dt
κ+ Et−1dt
)
.
The first term in brackets after the final equality on the right-hand side is the required gross nominal
interest to achieve $t = $ in a representative-agent model. The choice of a positive value of $¯ does not
guarantee that this is not less than one. The second term in brackets has positive probability realizations
less than one, so it follows that there are always realizations of shocks such that the required nominal
interest rate would be negative if targeting goods-price inflation. This completes the proof.
A.10 Proof of Result 10
The natural interest rate is obtained by substituting (A.8.1) into (A.8.4):
1 + %t =
κ+ dt
λ
Et
[
(1 + gt+1)dt+1
(κ+ dt+1)
]
. [A.10.1]
If TFP At follows a random walk with drift then the growth rate 1 + gt = At/At−1 is an i.i.d. stochastic
process.
Consider first the policy of targeting house-price inflation, pit = p¯i, which implies dt = λ/β for all t.
Substituting this into (A.10.1) implies:
1 + %t =
(
λ/β
λ
)(
κ+ (λ/β)
κ+ (λ/β)
)
Et[1 + gt+1] =
1 + g¯
β
,
where Etgt+1 = Egt = g¯ follows from the i.i.d. property of gt. This immediately implies E[%t] = (1+g¯)/β−1
and Var[%t] = 0.
Now consider the policy of targeting goods-price inflation, $t = $¯. The Fisher equation (A.9.2) implies
the ex-post real return on bonds is predictable, and thus (A.9.5) holds. Comparison with (A.8.1) confirms
that (A.9.6) holds, where Zt is measurable with respect to date-t information. Rearranging the equation
for Zt in (A.9.6) to solve for dt+1:
dt+1 = κ
(
1 + gt+1
Zt
− 1
)−1
,
and by taking expectations of both sides conditional on date-t information:
λ
β
= κEt
[(
1 + gt+1
Zt
− 1
)−1]
.
The left-hand side of this equation follows from (A.9.4). Since gt+1 is independent of variables known at
date t, and as Zt is known at date t, the right-hand side of the equation above is a time-invariant function
of Zt. As the left-hand side is a constant, it follows that Zt = Z for some Z > 0.
By substituting (A.9.6) into (A.10.1) and using Zt = Z:
1 + %t =
(κ+ dt)Z
λ
. [A.10.2]
Since dt = (λ/β)t according to (A.9.4), and Var[t] > 0 unless pit is predictable, it follows that Var[%t] > 0.
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With Zt = Z and Etgt+1 = g¯, the inequality in (A.9.7) implies:
Z <
λ(1 + g¯)
λ+ βκ
,
and together with (A.10.2) it follows that:
1 + %t <
(1 + g¯)(κ+ dt)
λ+ βκ
=
(1 + g¯)(κ+ dt)
β(κ+ (λ/β))
.
Since (A.9.4) implies Edt = λ/β, it must be the case that:
E[%t] <
(1 + g¯)(κ+ Edt)
β(κ+ (λ/β))
− 1 = 1 + g¯
β
− 1.
This demonstrates that E[%t] is smaller when goods-price inflation is the target, rather than house-price
inflation. It has already been shown that %t is more volatile when goods-price inflation is the target,
completing the proof.
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